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1 INTRODUCTION 
Current thinking on the causes of Europe's persistent unemployment 
problem does not accord much weight to open-economy considera-
tions. While there is agreement that the high unemployment of the 
1980s reflects an increased level in the non-accelerating inflation rate 
of unemployment (NAIRU), it is equally clear that the increase 
recorded since 1980 cannot plausibly be attributed to the same kind 
of unfavourable supply shocks, including terms-of-trade shocks, 
which are widely seen as the major cause of rising unemployment in 
the 1970s (see Blanchard and Summers, 1986). Most recent explana-
tions rely on one variant or another of hysteresis, that is, on the idea 
that a high equilibrium rate of unemployment may simply reflect a 
past history of high actual unemployment. 
A dissenting view has been put forward by Fitoussi and Phelps 
(1988) who emphasise the external shock emanating from the dra-
matic shift in the US policy mix at the beginning of the decade. As a 
result of this shift, Europe was all of a sudden confronted with a 
sharply higher level of real interest rates and a skyrocketing US dollar 
exchange rate. Whereas the dollar appreciation was subsequently 
fully reversed in the second half of the 1980s, real interest rates, 
though moderating somewhat after 1984, remained on a level dis-
tinctly higher than the norm of the 1970s. 
In discussing the effects of this external shock, it is useful to 
distinguish two issues. The first is the question of the short-term 
transmission mechanism. Here, Fitoussi and Phelps make much of 
the failure of the traditional Mundell-Fleming model to explain how 
a foreign interest rate shock can be contractionary at home under 
flexible exchange rates. They follow Sachs (1980), Dornbusch (1983) 
and others in demonstrating how the traditional result can be re-
versed once a direct channel of influence between the exchange rate 
and the price level is taken into account. They also show how pricing 
behaviour may be affected by a rising real interest rate so as to 
reinforce the supply-side effects of a depreciating exchange rate. We 
will not pursue this line of argument in the present chapter. 
As far as the remarkable persistence of high unemployment in 
Europe is concerned, a more important issue is the longer-term effect 
of the foreign shock on the dynamics of capital accumulation and on 
the determinants of labour market equilibrium. Here Fitoussi and 
Phelps emphasise various disinvestment incentives stemming from 
the sustained rise in the real interest rate. These effects include 
increased mark-ups in customer-markets; decreased labour hoarding; 
deferred capital maintenance; depressed prices and production in the 
capital goods industry and finally - 'more prosaic, yet, as an empirical 
matter, quite important' to quote Phelps (1989, p. 319) - the cutback 
of capital formation. 
The present chapter reviews the case of Germany in an attempt to 
assess whether this foreign-interest-rate-shock story is consistent with 
the major macroeconomic developments since 1980. We do not wish 
to set up the Fitoussi-Phelps hypothesis against the mainstream 
hysteresis hypothesis. In our opinion, it would be pointless to search 
for discriminating evidence since both hypotheses share a number of 
implications and are, in any event, best regarded as complementary 
rather than contradictory. Nor are we about to weigh the relative 
importance of the various possible channels through which the 
interest rate shock may have made itself felt. We prefer to follow 
Fitoussi and Phelps (1988, p. 74) in considering the capital-stock 
mechanism as 'emblematic of a polymorphous collection of real 
interest effects'. We thus focus on the role of capital formation and of 
plain capital-labour substitution. 
The core of the chapter consists of a simple model of employ-
ment-investment interaction in an open economy. We use the model 
to link the external-shock story with the voluminous labour market 
literature focusing on the role of real wage resistance and on 
measures of the so-called real wage gap. The latter is intended to 
serve as an indicator of how much real wages are above the level 
consistent with full employment. Here the empirical labour market 
literature is confronted with some sort of a paradox: any account 
linking unemployment to a lack of wage flexibility and hence disequi-
librium real wages would seem to require that the increase in unem-
ployment recorded since 1979/80 be accompanied and accounted for 
by an increase in measured real wage gaps. Of course, most of the 
theoretical stories offered in support of the hysteresis hypothesis, 
such as the insider-outsider theory, do depend on some measure of 
real wage rigidity. In fact, however, the experience of the 1980s offers 
little evidence of grossly excessive real wages. A l l the real wage gap 
indices offered in the literature fell to unprecedented lows while at 
the same time unemployment soared to levels not seen in recent 
history. 
It is our contention that this seemingly puzzling picture neatly fits 
into a consistent account of how the German economy responded to 
the major macroeconomic shocks of the 1970s and 1980s. Our analy-
sis goes back to the early 1970s when an unprecedented domestic 
wage explosion ended a long period of full employment and near-
price-stability. This was the episode that revived the interest in the 
concept of classical unemployment and first led to the construction of 
real wage gap indices. One decade later, the external real interest 
shock occurred at a time when the German labour market faced the 
challenge of absorbing a labour supply bulge caused by demographic 
factors. 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 2 
briefly reviews the major macroeconomic developments on which our 
theoretical interpretation will turn. Section 3 discusses the concept of 
the real wage gap. In Section 4, our open-economy model of employ-
ment and capital formation is developed and used to interpret the 
stylised facts. Section 5 offers some concluding remarks. 
2 SOME FACTS 
In this section, we take a look at the broad facts with which this 
chapter is concerned. The data are for the aggregate German econ-
omy and the time-span covered is 1961 to 1989. This period will form 
a convenient unit of analysis for some time to come as the German 
unification of 1990 has created a major break in every important time 
series. While the most conspicuous events in the period under review 
are certainly the three recessions, a minor one in 1967 and two major 
ones in 1974/75 and 1981/83, we do not focus on them in particular 
nor on the monetary turbulences surrounding them, but on the more 
Table 10.1 Selected economic indicators for Germany, 1961-89 
Variable 1961-73 1974-9 1980-89 
Employment (annual percentage change) 0.2 -0.1 0.3 
Labour force (annual percentage change) 0.2 0.1 0.8 
Unemployment rate (average per cent) 0.8 3.5 6.8 
Output (annual percentage change) 4.3 2.7 2.2 
Output per hour (annual percentage change) 5.1 3.8 2.5 
Real wages (annual percentage change) 5.1 2.4 1.9 
Capital stock (annual percentage change) 5.4 3.5 3.0 
Net investment (per cent of NNP) 21.5 13.3 10.6 
Real interest rate (average per cent) 2.8 3.1 4.6 
Source: Vierteljahrliche Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnung des Deut-
schen Instituts fur Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin; own calculations. 
fundamental and more sustained changes in the real, non-monetary 
indicators of macroeconomic performance which stand out beyond 
the ups and downs of the business cycle. It is our presumption that 
these underlying trends of the real economy are shaped by real forces 
and, accordingly, the monetary history is not taken into account; 
hence we abstract from short-run real effects of monetary disturb-
ances - which we thereby do not mean to deny. 
The developments addressed by our subsequent analysis are sum-
marised in Table 10.1 and Figure 10.1. They concern the trends in 
output, employment, capital formation, labour costs and the interest 
rate. We comment briefly on each in turn. 
2.1 Output and Employment 
The 1974/75 recession put an end to more than a decade of almost 
uninterrupted overemployment during which excess labour demand 
attracted a large number of immigrant workers and unemployment 
was negligible. As illustrated in the middle panel of Figure 10.1, the 
unemployment rate then rose sharply in each of the two major 
recessions and in each case failed to return to its previous level. 
Employment remained virtually stagnant. While it is true that an 
acceleration of labour force growth in the 1980s placed an additional 
strain on the flexibility of the labour market, the continued slowdown 
of output growth and productivity growth strongly suggested the 
continued operation of some factor which depressed labour demand. 
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Figure 10.1 Wage gap, unemployment rate and net investment in 
Germany, 1961-89 
Source: See Table 10.1. 
A convincing account of the employment record should be able to 
identify this factor. 
2.2 Real Wages 
Excessive real wage growth, widely considered the principal cause of 
rising unemployment, appeared harder and harder to blame, as 
unemployment remained high and rose even higher in the 1980s. 
While the declining trend of real wage growth in the sub-periods 
shown in Table 10.1 conceals significant variations within the sub-
periods, the time-path of the real wage gap index displayed in the top 
panel of Figure 10.1 casts serious doubt on the hypothesis that real 
wages are stuck on too high a level. 2 The wage gap, calculated as an 
index of the real wage level relative to trend productivity (as ex-
plained in more detail in Section 3), indeed rose sharply in the early 
1970s, immediately before the first significant increase in the unem-
ployment rate. This reflected the well-documented 1969-74 wage 
explosion (see, for example, Sachs, 1979) coinciding with, and ex-
acerbated by, the productivity slowdown and other supply shocks. 
However, the wage gap declined steadily in the late 1970s and 
throughout the 1980s when unemployment rose still higher. Any 
model of unemployment is challenged to explain this changing pat-
tern in the relative movement of real wages and employment. 
2.3 Capital Formation 
The net investment ratio, plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 10.1, 
displays the usual cyclical variations around an apparently declining 
long-term trend. The fall in investment was particularly steep in the 
first half of the 1970s. Another sharp cutback occurred in the early 
1980s when the investment ratio sank to an unprecedented low from 
which it did not begin to recover until late in the decade. The 
slowdown of investment spending naturally translated into a falling 
growth rate of the capital stock. While the capital stock continued to 
grow more rapidly than employment, as one would expect in the 
normal course of economic growth, a rough comparison of the two 
growth rates in the three sub-periods of Table 10.1 reveals a signifi-
cant slowdown in capital stock growth. Although the data alone do 
not reveal how much of this slowdown is attributable to a slowdown 
of (labour-augmenting) technical progress, it appears highly unlikely 
that any story about labour being displaced by capital can account for 
the poor employment record. As we pointed out in the introduction, 
the disinvestment process will occupy centre stage in our analysis. 
2.4 Real Interest Rate 
The last row of Table 10.1 presents period averages of the long-
term real interest rate. Although it was subject to numerous real 
and monetary disturbances throughout the period under review, the 
real interest rate never departed systematically from the historical 
norm of about 3 per cent up to the late 1970s. At that time, the 
level of world real interest rates increased sharply. The German 
economy, linked to the world financial system by unrestricted capital 
flows, could not escape this general trend. It is noteworthy, however, 
that Germany experienced less of a real interest rate shock than 
many other European countries at that time. These differences are 
presumably due to the fact that, on the whole, the rest of Europe 
experienced a much more pronounced transition from inflation to 
disinflation at this juncture. Still, the increase in the level of German 
real interest rates was far from negligible. 
3 T H E CONCEPT OF T H E R E A L W A G E G A P 3 
Ever since it became customary to discuss persistent unemployment 
in terms of the real wage gap, the concept was meant to measure the 
discrepancy between the actual real wage and what it ought to be in 
order not to stand in the way of full employment. Also, it was always 
realised that any comparison of actual real wage levels with the levels 
prevailing in earlier times of full employment must allow for so-called 
'warranted' real wage increases that would have taken place even 
under permanent full employment. The difficult part is how to deter-
mine what is 'warranted'. 
The simplest and least sophisticated, but also the most popular, 
way of answering this question is to adjust actual real wage growth for 
actual productivity growth - as in Calmfors and Nymoen (1990, Table 
1), to cite but one recent example. More sophisticated approaches try 
to take into account the fact that excess real wage growth endogen-
ously generates additional productivity growth as firms are forced to 
move up their labour demand curves. Depending on how easily 
labour and other factors of production can be substituted for each 
other, any excess real wage growth will appear at least in part 'to pay 
for itself. 
Suppose output Y is a function of capital K, labour N and time t: 
Y = F(K, N, t) (1) 
If this production function exhibits constant returns to scale (CRS) 
and a constant elasticity of substitution, and if we assume competitive 
profit-maximising firms, the first-order condition governing the 
labour demand behaviour of firms yields the following log-linear 
relationship between the average product of labour and the real wage 
(with lower-case letters, except t9 denoting logs): 
y - n = a 0 + o(w - U) + Xt (2) 
In this equation, w is the log of the real wage, a 0 is a constant, o is the 
elasticity of substitution and X, is the rate of autonomous productivity 
change due to technical progress. In the limiting case of the Cobb-
Douglas production function (o = 1), productivity moves one-to-one 
with the real wage so that any real wage growth appears 'justified9 ex 
post by the resulting productivity growth.4 More generally, (2) can be 
interpreted as saying that labour productivity deviates from its long-
term trend whenever the real wage deviates from this same trend. 
The trend deviation of the real wage, w - A/, is what Gordon (1988, 
p. 287) has called the 'adjusted wage gap\ By relating the real wage to 
trend productivity rather than actual productivity, this measure is 
presumed free of any bias stemming from endogenous productivity 
changes. We can rewrite (2) so as to make plain how the adjusted 
wage gap is related to the unadjusted wage gap, where the latter is 
simply an index of the wage share in national income: 
w + n - y = - a 0 + (1 - o)(w - kt) (3) 
Obviously, the wage share moves in the same direction as the ad-
justed wage gap if the elasticity of substitution falls short of unity. 
The wage gap index plotted in Figure 10.1, above, is based on 
estimates of Equations (2) and (3) reported in Landmann and Jerger 
(1991). In line with most other studies, these estimates imply a value 
of o significantly and substantially below unity. 
4 C A P I T A L A C C U M U L A T I O N A N D E M P L O Y M E N T IN A N 
O P E N E C O N O M Y 
We now turn to the question of how the changing pattern in the 
relative movement of the adjusted real wage gap and employment 
can be explained. As pointed out in the introduction, the sustained 
decline of real wages relative to labour productivity since the mid-
1970s is widely taken as first-hand evidence that unions have learnt 
the bitter lessons of the early 1970s and have moderated their wage 
claims in the face of continued high unemployment. Far-reaching 
conclusions have been derived from this interpretation for both 
analysis and policy. In particular, many economists have questioned 
the empirical relevance of theories that explain persistent unemploy-
ment as a manifestation of persistent aggregate excess supply on the 
labour market stemming from inadequate real wage flexibility, no 
matter what particular rigidity is thought to be at work. Union 
leaders, in turn, feel that they have distributive justice on their side, 
and economic reason not against them, as they attempt to recover 
lost ground after years of adverse redistribution. 
To see what is wrong with this type of conclusion, we consider a 
simple model of capital stock determination, wage-setting behaviour 
and employment in an open economy. The model abstracts from 
monetary and other demand side disturbances which may entail 
short-run real effects. The focus is entirely on the longer term 
response of unemployment and the wage gap to changes in wage 
setting, capital formation and the labour force. To simplify matters, 
the theoretical analysis assumes away autonomous productivity 
change due to technical progress so that the real wage can directly be 
identified with the adjusted real wage-gap index as derived above. In 
the same way, the model generates stationary equilibrium values of 
the capital stock and the capital-labour ratio that are therefore best 
interpreted as trend-adjusted. 
Starting from the CRS production function (1), and suppressing 
the time trend, we can write the marginal product of labour FN as a 
function of the capital-labour ratio which is equated to the real wage 
W by profit-maximising employers: 
Wage setters are assumed to aim at a real wage target which depends 
on the state of the labour market represented by the rate of employ-
ment: 
N is the labour force, P is a measure of what is commonly referred to 
as 'real wage flexibility'. The shift parameter z captures all other real 
forces that impinge on the wage bargain (the wedge between the 
consumption wage and the producer wage, the militancy and bargain-
ing strength of unions, unemployment benefits and so on). 5 Equa-
W = FN(K/N) (4) 
W = z(NIN)* (5) 
lions (4) and (5) together determine a labour market equilibrium in 
the sense that the real wage outcome intended by wage-setters 
according to (S) is consistent with the demand price of labour derived 
from (4). Since the wage bargain is cast in nominal terms, actual 
outcomes may differ from the equilibrium solution due to expecta-
tional errors and nominal rigidities as analysed by Blanchard (1990). 
Any such disequilibrium sets in motion a wage-price spiral which 
must eventually end, however, when monetary accommodation stops 
and the authorities adjust nominal demand growth so as to force 
output and employment back to their equilibrium levels (Layard and 
Bean, 1989). Equilibrium employment can thus be thought of as the 
level associated with the N A I R U . As noted above, we are not 
concerned with deviations from the N A I R U in this chapter. The 
position of the labour market equilibrium obviously depends on the 
capital stock which in turn gradually adjusts to its optimal level 
determined by the condition that the net marginal product of capital 
FK be equal to the cost of capital r*. 6 
FK(KIN) - r* (6) 
Due to the openness of the economy* the cost of capital is assumed to 
be given exogenously from the world capital market. Equations (6), 
(4) and (5) - in this order - recursively determine the capital-labour 
ratio, the real wage (or adjusted real wage gap) and the rate of 
(un)employment. The implied interaction of capital formation and 
employment is visualised in Figures 10.2 and 10.3 which depict the 
consequences of changes in the wage-setting process, World capital 
market conditions and the labour force, respectively. In both figures, 
the top panel depicts the capital-labour ratio as determined by the 
exogenous cost of capital according to Equation (6), In the bottom 
panel, the Nd schedule represents labour demand as given by 
Equation (4) and the WS schedule represents the wage-setting 
Equation (5). 
Suppose there is an exogenous shock to the wage-setting process 
such as the widely analysed European wage explosion of the early 
1970s, as discussed for example by Sachs (1979). This is depicted in 
Figure 10.2. Assuming an initial equilibrium at point A (in both 
panels), the wage-setting schedule WS is shifted upwards leading to a 
new transitory equilibrium with a higher real wage and lower employ-
ment at point B. While the capital stock cannot respond immediately, 
firms find themselves with a higher than desired capital-labour ratio 
Figure 10.2 A wage shock Figure 10 J An interest rate shock 
and a labour force increase 
and thus begin to reduce their capital stock by cutting back on 
investment spending. This in turn lowers the marginal productivity of 
labour so that the N* schedule shifts down. As a consequence, 
employment falls even further, thus strengthening the disinvestment 
incentives of firms. The adjustment process comes to an end at point 
C (in both panels of the figure), whsre the initial capital-labour ratio 
and hence the initial real wage level are re-established at a lower rate 
of employment ( N c ) . 
Two major points emerge from this analysis. Firstly, the push for 
higher wages not only depresses employment directly, by forcing 
firms up their labour-demand schedules, but also indirectly, by 
setting off a disinvestment process. Secondly, an increase in the real 
wage gap occurs only temporarily, as long as the capital stock has not 
yet fully adjusted to its new steady-state level (Kc). In contrast, the 
higher unemployment caused by the wage-setting shock is perma-
nent. It thus becomes clear that the concept of the real wage gap does 
not tell us anything useful about whether wage behaviour gives 
adequate consideration to the requirements of full employment. In 
fact, with the real wage endogenously determined by the equilibrium 
capital-labour ratio, it is meaningless to ask what real wage level is 
consistent with full employment. Thus the very concept of a real wage 
gap is ill-defined.7 
The simple exercise presented in Figure 10.2 roughly replicates the 
experience of Germany and a number of other European economies 
during the 1970s. After a parallel rise in unemployment and the real 
wage gap in the first half of the decade unemployment remained 
high, while the real wage gap (and the labour share) began to decline 
and the investment ratio remained low. In the same vein, we can ask 
how our model economy responds to a rise in the world real interest 
rate and to an increased flow of entrants into the labour force, which 
were characteristics of the 1980s as shown in Table 10.1, above. The 
analysis of this case is given in Figure 10.3. The two exogenous forces 
shift two schedules. In the upper panel, the ray representing the 
equilibrium capital-labour ratio rotates downwards in response to the 
higher cost of capital. In the lower panel, the labour force is assumed 
to increase from N0 to Nx. As we can infer from Equation (5), the WS 
schedule shifts to the right by an amount exactly equal to the propor-
tional increase in the labour force. Starting from an initial equilib-
rium at point C, firms curtail their domestic investment spending so 
as to adjust their capital stock downwards to the lower level war-
ranted by the higher world real interest rate r*. As a consequence, 
the labour demand schedule in the lower panel shifts downwards 
impeding the absorption of the increase in the labour force. A d -
ditional workers could have been employed along the path CC with 
a temporarily given capital stock and, with an unchanged real interest 
rate r J, investment would have taken place to restore the capital-
labour ratio and the unemployment rate to their initial level (at point 
C"). With the simultaneous interest rate shock, however, the in-
duced disinvestment process limits the scope for increases in employ-
ment and instead places additional downward pressure on the real 
wage.8 The adjustment process thus takes place along the path CD 
(in both panels).9 
The adjustment pattern of capital formation is perhaps where the 
openness of the economy matters most. In a closed economy, a 
sustained shortfall of investment, however caused, would sooner or 
later force down the real interest rate as savings have nowhere else to 
go. In the (small) open economy, in contrast, international capital 
mobility essentially disconnects the saving process from the dynamics 
of investment. Disturbances to either have no lasting effects on the 
interest rate, but are absorbed by capital flows and accordingly show 
up in the current account.10 Despite the doubts about this view raised 
by Feldstein and Horioka (1980), this is pretty much what happened 
in the case of Germany whose current account surplus ballooned in 
the 1980s under the pressure of excess savings. 
The other predictions of the model were also borne out by the 
experience of the 1980s. Anaemic employment growth, far too low to 
absorb the substantial increase in the labour force, a marked decline 
in the real wage gap and the labour share, and a sustained weakness 
of investment spending are the most salient features of the German 
macroeconomic performance since 1980 as summarised in Figure 10.1 
and Table 10.1, above. Discussing the consequences of weak dom-
estic capital formation in Germany, the O E C D (1988, p. 53) aptly 
diagnosed a 'vicious circle* of sluggish capacity growth and job 
creation in which 'weak economic growth eventually began feeding 
upon itself. The mutually depressing effects of falling output and 
employment on investment and of the falling capital stock on labour 
demand, are indeed the central mechanism driving the contractionary 
adjustment process portrayed in Figures 10.2 and 10.3. 
5 S U M M A R Y A N D CONCLUSIONS 
After a disappointing macroeconomic performance in the 1970s, 
much of Europe did even worse in the 1980s - except, perhaps, for 
the inflation record. Unemployment soared, output and productivity 
growth continued to slow down, real wages increased even less than 
productivity, and capital formation was down. According to the 
hypothesis advanced by Fitoussi and Phelps (1988), this dismal record 
is not just a consequence of widely-blamed 'Eurosclerosis' but a 
direct outgrowth of the dramatic increase in the world real interest 
rate which, in turn, is mainly attributed to the enormous American 
thirst for capital. In this chapter, we have reviewed the major macro-
economic developments in Germany up to 1989 and attempted to 
account for these developments within a simple analytical frame-
work. Using a simple model of capital formation and employment in 
an open economy, we distinguished three major exogenous events 
that affected the German labour market from 1970. The first was the 
wage explosion which occurred in the early 1970s, ending the 'golden 
age' of rapid economic growth and continuous full employment. The 
second was the foreign interest rate shock of the early 1980s empha-
sised by Fitoussi and Phelps. The third was the relatively rapid 
expansion of the labour force in the 1980s. The broad pattern of 
investment, employment and real wage growth predicted by the 
model conforms reasonably well to actual experience. 
We have devoted particular attention to the concept of the real 
wage gap which is widely used to appraise the consistency of wage 
behaviour with the requirement of full employment/The sustained 
decline of the wage gap since the second half of the 1970s, often 
regarded as puzzling in view of the dramatic rise of unemployment, 
is not hard to explain within our analytical framework. The model 
does not contradict the idea that excessive wage pressure is to blame 
for high unemployment, but it contradicts the idea that the wage gap, 
as usually calculated, is a useful indicator of such wage pressure. 
Although an autonomous wage push does cause an increase in the 
measured wage gap, we have shown that this increase is reversed over 
time even though unemployment continues to rise as firms are in-
duced to adjust their capital stock downwards. Similarly, an exogen-
ously caused slowdown of capital formation and an increase in the 
labour force can both be shown to depress the measured real wage 
gap indices although both contribute to higher unemployment in the 
presence of real wage resistance. 
According to our model, changes in the labour force have only 
transitory effects on the real wage gap and the unemployment rate. 
Changes in wage-setting behaviour relative to trend productivity 
growth have transitory effects on the real wage gap, but permanent 
effects on the unemployment rate. Changes in the desired capital 
intensity of production, in contrast, permanently affect the real wage 
gap and the unemployment rate. Certainly, one may feel somewhat 
uncomfortable with the notion that the wage bargain does not 
eventually respond endogenously to changes in the pace of technical 
progress and capital accumulation other than via changes in unem-
ployment. If wage-setters smoothly adapted to all changes in pro-
ductivity growth, unemployment ought to be immune to such changes 
(Bean, 1989). However, a large body of evidence suggests that this 
learning process is at best very slow. 1 1 In the 1980s, the fall of the real 
wage gap and the labour share was widely regarded as proof that the 
learning process had taken place after all. We have argued above, 
however, that the adjustment of the desired capital-labour ratio in 
response to the higher world real interest rate made a fall in the real 
wage gap inevitable, whatever the flexibility of wage-setting behaviour. 
In view of the difficulties that high real interest rates have caused 
in the 1980s, various observers, for example Phelps (1989), have 
condemned the massive American borrowing on the global capital 
markets as a beggar-thy-neighbour manoeuvre. From the German 
perspective, however, this reproach hardly appears tenable. En-
dowed with a high propensity to save, Germany has been a net capital 
exporter for most of the post-war era. What should a country be 
thought to experience when one of its export items suddenly fetches a 
much higher price on the world market? A welfare loss? If 'one can 
reasonably condemn recent American policy' for draining the world 
capital market, as Phelps (1989) suggests, this may be a valid point 
with respect to the indebted less developed countries (LDCs) and 
other regions that are short of domestic savings. But in the case of 
Germany, the failure to turn a potentially welfare-improving oppor-
tunity on the world capital market into a real-income gain rather than 
into rising unemployment is entirely self-inflicted. 
The lesson to be learned is that, in an open economy, workers and 
their representatives must recognise the constraints created by the 
asymmetry between internationally mobile capital and (relatively) 
immobile labour. With the price of capital determined on the world 
market, the factor-price frontier does not leave any degree of free-
dom for the domestic price of labour. For labour as a whole, the 
pursuit of distributional ambitions in recurrent wage rounds, at best 
yields transitory income gains, whereas the resulting unemployment 
is permanent. For the unions, there is good news and bad news in this 
lesson. The bad news is that a sustainable improvement in the 
unemployment situation requires a moderation of wage aspirations, 
even after years of low real wage growth and a falling wage share. 
The good news is that such moderation, while amounting to a real 
income loss for employed workers in the short run, spurs domestic 
capital formation, which in time redresses the initial real wage posi-
tion as the economy moves to lower unemployment. 
The rapid completion of German economic and monetary union in 
1990 has confronted the employment system with a challenge of an 
entirely different dimension. We have not addressed the new situa-
tion in this chapter. But the integration of a region which is hope-
lessly undercapitalised and at the same time inhabited by a workforce 
eager to catch up with western living standards and willing to move in 
large numbers to where the good jobs are, is bound to drive home 
forcefully the importance of the mutually reinforcing interaction 
of capital formation and employment emphasised by our analysis. 
Decision-makers in all domains of public policy share the responsi-
bility for turning this interdependence into a virtuous rather than a 
vicious circle. 
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1. The authors are grateful to S0ren Bo Nielsen, discussant and the partici-
pants of the Conference for their helpful comments. 
2. This was noted by various writers; see e.g. Gordon (1988). 
3. For a more thorough treatment of the conceptual and empirical founda-
tions of the real wage gap, see Krugman (1987) and Schultze (1987). 
4. This observation has led some economists to question the usefulness of 
productivity-related wage guidelines; see Hellwig and Neumann 
(1987). 
5. In the context of a growing economy, z would also have to capture the 
influence of anticipated productivity growth. 
6. We do not explicitly model the adjustment process in this chapter. For an 
account of the joint investment and employment dynamics within a 
rigorous optimising framework, see Burda (1988) and Landmann and 
Jerger (1991). 
7. Robert Solow (1986, p. 527) has made the same point in a somewhat 
related context: '(the real wage) is not for wishing: wishing should be 
reserved for exogenous variables . . 
8. Depending on the relative size of the changes in the interest rate and the 
labour force, the net employment change could also turn out negative. 
9. This analysis assumes that the labour force increases gradually. With a 
sudden increase, the adjustment would take place along the path 
C C D . 
10. See Sachs (1981) and Blanchard and Fischer (1989, section 2.4) for 
formal treatments of these current account mechanics. 
11. For instance, in Phillips-curve estimates for Germany, Franz (1984 and 
1987) has found a significantly less than proportional response of nominal 
wages to changes in productivity growth. 
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